International Relations through the Prism of Democracy
The processes of democratization and the protection of human rights play a key role in shaping the global strategy of the United States, which actively employs these principles as foundational elements of development. This is because democracy, according to the U.S. government, is regarded as one of the most important criteria for a developed state and a prerequisite for the existence of a conflict-free society. These processes significantly influence the political systems of the United States and most European Union countries, which, in turn, affect their positions on the global stage and their foreign policy courses. However, the democratization process in Central Asia has distinct characteristics, shaped by local customs, traditions, historical legacies, and ideological particularities.
The prospects for advancing democracy in Central Asian societies are directly tied to the economic development levels of the states and their degree of integration into the global community. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and European Union countries actively supported internal reforms in Central Asia, including democratic transformations, market reforms, human rights promotion, the expansion of religious freedom, and efforts to enhance welfare and tolerance.
U.S. and EU assistance in implementing democratic reforms extended across all levels — from transforming political systems and institutions of governance to preparing a new political elite in the region’s countries. This comprehensive effort aimed to instill democratic values in the consciousness of both the governing elites and the general population. However, the United States and its allies overlooked a critical feature of the local elites: after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the individuals who rose to power in the newly independent states were those who, “by the whim of historical fate,” happened to be in the right place at the right time.
At the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, most of the elected leaders — the presidents of the newly formed states — held senior positions in the Soviet system. They were party cell secretaries, chairmen of collective farms, or members of the Soviet intelligentsia in scientific or cultural roles. These individuals were born and raised in the Soviet ideological framework and held leadership positions within that system. They neither contemplated nor were prepared for democratic reforms. Such changes came not through their will or desire but as a consequence of historical circumstances. This raises a legitimate question: how could individuals shaped by the Soviet system suddenly transform their worldview and embrace new principles of global order?
The Soviet state, as is well known, was not built on the rule of law and, in essence, was never a state governed by law. Instead, it functioned as an ideocratic state, where public policy was dictated by ideological considerations and the desires of a narrow circle of individuals involved in governance. This model of power was largely preserved and transferred to the new sovereign states of Central Asia.
The new so-called leaders retained the old model of governance while adding local elements, such as a cult of personality, family dynasties, and total power consolidation. Furthermore, traditional family and clan-based loyalties, combined with regional allegiances, created fertile ground for authoritarianism. These conditions transformed former Soviet administrators — party cell secretaries and collective farm chairmen — into modern-day dictators.
The Rise to Power of These Leaders Was Neither Systematic nor a Deliberate Choice by the Masses
The rise of these individuals to power was neither a systematic nor a deliberate choice by the masses, who elected leaders that, over time, became unelectable and untouchable for decades, contrary to the norms originally outlined in the constitutions of their respective countries. The phenomenon of rewriting fundamental laws to serve personal interests has been and continues to be observed across all Central Asian countries. Moreover, societies in these nations have been conditioned to submissiveness and have never experienced democracy or democratic values. These concepts were entirely alien to them, and skillful authoritarian leaders quickly recognized this, establishing strong, centralized leadership and promoting a cult of personality, achieving unprecedented levels of control.
This method of governance persists to this day, even in countries within the region where presidents have been replaced. For instance, in Uzbekistan, significant hopes were placed on Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s leadership to transform the country’s repressive autocracy into a more open and modern state. However, the expected democratic reforms did not materialize. On the contrary, Mirziyoyev, like his predecessor, continues to consolidate power. In Turkmenistan, the situation is even worse. Only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have made some attempts toward democratization, but these efforts have not resulted in meaningful changes.
If we look back and examine how it all began, it becomes evident that, at the start of their rule, these leaders appeared to aspire to the creation of democratic societies and seemed willing to develop democratic mechanisms of governance. Evidence of the democratization of political processes in Central Asia can be found in several signed documents, such as the Charter on Strategic Partnership between the United States and the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Joint Statement on Relations between the United States and the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the United States and the Republic of Uzbekistan.
These documents contain provisions aimed at supporting the democratization processes in the region, including backing civil institutions, even those not loyal to the existing political regimes. Thanks to U.S. support, the political opposition in Central Asian countries gained the ability to operate safely and received financial support. Furthermore, these countries joined numerous international and European organizations that advocate for the democratization of society.
Mediated by the United States and European Union countries, a “government-opposition” dialogue was established in Central Asia. For example, in Tajikistan, opposition groups drafted amendments to election legislation.
Despite these measures, three decades later, Central Asian countries have not become democratic. On the contrary, they have taken a course toward authoritarianism and totalitarianism. After gaining independence, regional leaders initially intended to follow the democratic path inspired by the examples of Western countries and the United States. They eagerly sought to integrate their nations into the international arena by showcasing economic opportunities and resources, establishing national symbols such as flags and emblems, forming armies and fleets, and announcing global initiatives and peaceful intentions.
However, by the early 2000s, authoritarian leaders appeared to realize that democracy, while facilitating societal development, posed significant risks to their rule. Democracy reduces the distance between citizens and the government, enables political leadership to obtain more accurate information, allows individuals to live according to laws that ensure personal freedoms and human rights, and helps citizens protect their interests. Additionally, democratic countries are generally wealthier and have higher levels of human development compared to nondemocratic states.
However, democratic values—such as the prevention of despotism, political equality, and the ability of citizens to participate in decision-making processes—posed tremendous risks to Central Asian dictators, their families, and their inner circles. These leaders encouraged the cult of their personalities to such an extent that they came to believe in their right to be “eternal” rulers of their countries and peoples.
They realized that continuing along the democratic path would jeopardize their position. Opposition forces or other political actors could, at any moment, replace them and take away what they considered their rightful possessions. For them, this equated to political and personal suicide. They faced a critical choice: to continue on the democratic path and ensure a democratic future for their citizens and countries, or to adopt a course toward authoritarianism, despotism, and totalitarianism. The answer to this question is well known to all of us.
This Choice Became a Serious Obstacle to the Modernization Impulse
This choice became a serious obstacle to the modernization impulse set in motion by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, which provided a unique historical opportunity for the peoples of Central Asia to align themselves with progressive and predictable systems of political and socio-economic governance, as well as to foster a new, modern cultural self-identity rooted in values and worldview.
This exceptional chance to go down in history as the founding fathers of a new society — one based on democratic principles, free and lawful expression of the people’s will, capable of building a competitive and prosperous economy, as well as a fair and efficient social system for all — was largely missed by the leaders of Central Asia. As a result, hybrid paternalistic regimes with a Soviet core and a pseudo-democratic façade emerged across the region.
Such regimes are built on the total control of all transformative social processes by the state, touching every sphere of public life — from economic to political and ideological.
The new national leaders became not only the first presidents but also the wealthiest individuals in their respective countries. The idea of realizing the sovereign right of the people to establish politically independent, economically sustainable, and socially responsible states reflecting the interests of the majority quietly faded into the background. The very concept of democracy began to contradict the interests of the ruling elites and their inner circles.
Authoritarian regimes in the region are deeply convinced that democratic reforms would undermine their positions of power and jeopardize the pseudo-stability and pseudo-security they claim to provide. Consequently, the authorities of Central Asia insist that the focus should be on combating terrorism and Islamic radicalism rather than on promoting democratic values, which they argue are being “imposed” by Western countries.
This narrative is highly convenient: on the one hand, they tell the West that regional security is paramount and demand assistance in ensuring it; on the other hand, they reject democratic values, claiming they can manage without them.
The security narrative also gives these regimes a pretext to suppress opposition, labeling opponents as extremists and banning their activities. This practice is particularly prevalent in Tajikistan.
These regimes are fully aware that strong democracy poses a mortal threat to their power consolidation. While the threats of terrorism and Islamic radicalism are genuine concerns, the potential for instability in Central Asia stems not only from extremist activities, as local regimes claim.
Global security threats in the region arise from a combination of factors: high levels of poverty, a lack of opportunities and hope for the future among young people, interethnic and interregional tensions, the total suppression of citizens’ rights and freedoms, widespread corruption, excessive bureaucracy, and the culture of veneration for authority.
It is these issues that undermine the stability of states and create threats to regional security, not the democratic values “imposed” by the West.
It is important to emphasize that, in some cases, the greatest threat comes from the dictatorial regimes themselves, which suppress their populations and prioritize their own security above all else. Examples of this include the rule of Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan or the January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan.
In all the countries of the region, genuine public participation in governance is surrounded by numerous legal constraints and so-called “democratic amendments.” The state apparatus, having retained the mechanisms and ideologies of authoritarian regimes, has transformed its population into a compliant electorate, obediently fulfilling the whims of those in power.
Another Narrative Promoted by Regional Authorities
Another narrative promoted by regional authorities (as well as some Western experts opposed to the promotion of democracy) is that, due to its historical development, Central Asia is fundamentally different from the rest of the world and cannot be adapted to Western values. Undoubtedly, governmental mechanisms may vary depending on the society, but concepts such as free and fair elections, government transparency, accountability to parliament, and a developed civil society are integral to any democratic state. These principles cannot contradict the specific characteristics of any particular region or people.
All five republics agreed to these standards when they joined the United Nations and the OSCE. The issue is not about imposing specific political models but rather accelerating democratic processes. However, the concept of “democracy” evokes mostly negative associations among much of the population in the region, as local propaganda seeks to equate democracy and democratic values with immorality, perversion, social disintegration, and moral decay.
Many residents of the region prefer strong, authoritarian leaders, but at the same time, they are concerned about corruption in the highest levels of government, the absence of a fair judicial system, the inefficiency of state institutions, and widespread human rights violations. While Central Asian regimes may not be advocates of democracy, its concept and components are nonetheless embedded in their legal systems.
Most of the necessary democratic institutions exist in Central Asian countries, but they lack practical application. For example, a strong legal framework has been established, but it is not implemented in practice. In all the countries of the region, the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches exists only in theory. In practice, these branches do not function independently, as all decisions, both vertically and horizontally, are dictated by the initiative and will of the heads of state. These leaders aim to convince their people that without them, everything would collapse.
Political parties and civil society have been established in the region, but their creation stems from a desire to appease Western countries and give citizens the impression that state-building processes are ongoing. Central Asian regimes have excelled in financing pro-government NGOs and political parties that support ruling elites. For the EU, the United States, the OSCE, and other pro-democracy forces, it is becoming increasingly difficult to criticize the lack of reforms, as all the necessary democratic institutions formally exist in Central Asia. Proving that Central Asian democracy is merely superficial is no easy task.
The international community, particularly democratic countries, must not only criticize the significant shortcomings in the functioning of governments, parliaments, judicial systems, political parties, and civil society but also take concrete steps to change the situation in the region. First and foremost, it is essential to foster more open discussions on these issues and draw clear distinctions between genuine democratic processes and “facade democracies.”
Another Significant Reason for the Lack of Democratic Development in the Region
Another significant reason why democracy and democratic institutions have not developed in the region, and why it was previously under Russian influence and is now increasingly falling under China’s sphere of influence (despite China’s relatively recent expansion into Central Asia compared to Western countries and the United States), lies in the following: Western countries promoting democracy have themselves suffered from a “crisis of identity,” and their credibility has been seriously undermined by accusations of double standards.
Authoritarian leaders often emphasize that, before criticizing others, the United States should address its own violations, such as reports of torture and misconduct by American military personnel during the war on terror. Regional leaders also frequently point out that the European Union has become more reserved on human rights issues when its energy interests are at stake.
The OSCE, which once played a key role in security issues and served as a tool for promoting democracy, has lost much of its former authority. This decline is due to internal divisions regarding its humanitarian agenda and accusations from some post-Soviet republics, which claim that Western members of the organization should not lecture their Eastern neighbors, as they themselves are “not without sin” in the fields of democracy and human rights.
Central Asian countries are also able to reject the West’s pro-democracy agenda because they have an alternative in China. They can always do business with this economic giant, which not only refrains from interfering in the domestic affairs of its business partners but also adheres to a similar political approach itself. Unlike Western countries, the grants provided by China, while conditional and containing many hidden clauses, do not require Central Asian regimes to implement democratic reforms, uphold the rule of law, or respect human rights.
From our perspective, the demands of Western countries and the United States are intended to benefit the people of the region. However, from the perspective of authoritarian regimes, these demands pose a threat to their survival. In this sense, the Central Asian authorities are not wrong.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The analysis of the lack of democratic development in Central Asia demonstrates that the main obstacles are both internal and external. The historical legacy of the Soviet system, which fostered authoritarian governance models, has entrenched power structures focused on the concentration of authority within a narrow elite. These systems nominally adhere to democratic norms but, in practice, suppress political competition, restrict citizens’ rights, and promote the cult of leadership.
Geopolitical realities also play a significant role. The influence of China and Russia, reinforced by their economic and political support for authoritarian regimes, stands in contrast to Western efforts to promote democratic values. However, the West’s double standards and prioritization of economic interests have weakened its moral leadership. At the same time, China offers financial assistance without requiring democratic reforms, making it a more convenient partner for local elites.
Public perceptions of democracy remain a key factor. Propaganda in the region often portrays democratic values as synonymous with chaos, immorality, and instability. Young people, who represent a significant portion of the population, are disillusioned with authoritarian models but see no viable alternatives due to the absence of institutions that could ensure justice, development, and the protection of their rights.
Recommendations
To strengthen democratic processes and counter authoritarian trends in Central Asia, the international community, especially Western countries, should take the following steps:
1. Focus on Youth as the Key Driver of Change
The youth of Central Asia is weary of authoritarian regimes and the dominant influence of Russia and China. Western countries need to invest in educational and cultural programs that foster critical thinking, entrepreneurship, and leadership skills. Programs for academic exchange, scholarships, and international internships will provide young people with access to new knowledge and opportunities.
2. Support for Independent Civil Institutions
Supporting non-governmental organizations, independent media, and initiatives focused on human rights should be a priority. These institutions can play a crucial role in shaping democratic consciousness and creating platforms for dialogue.
3. Emphasis on Education and Economic Opportunities
The youth in the region faces limited access to quality education and employment prospects. The international community should support projects aimed at job creation, small business development, and professional training.
4. Long-Term Strategies for Democratization
Instead of short-term projects, long-term strategies should be developed and implemented, including gradual reforms in governance systems, the promotion of the rule of law, and increased transparency. These reforms must be adapted to the cultural and social characteristics of the region.
5. Countering Chinese and Russian Influence
The West should strengthen its presence in the region by offering alternative models of cooperation based on equality, support for reforms, and the development of democratic institutions. It is important not only to criticize authoritarian regimes but also to highlight the benefits of open and inclusive societies.
6. Establishing New Platforms for Dialogue
Organizing international forums, conferences, and working groups focused on democracy, human rights, and sustainable development can facilitate the exchange of experience and foster a collective approach to addressing regional challenges.
Conclusion
The democratization of Central Asia requires particular attention to its youth as the driving force for change. This segment of society is disillusioned with authoritarian leaders and seeks opportunities to build a more just, open, and prosperous future. Western countries must not only support political and economic reforms but also provide the younger generation of the region with access to education, professional growth, and cultural exchange.
A successful transformation of the region requires a comprehensive and long-term approach, including support for civil society, strengthening economic opportunities, and the development of independent state institutions. Only through open dialogue, integration, and respect for local specificities can sustainable development and stability in Central Asia be achieved.
Author:
Sharofiddin Gadoev, President of the Foundation for the Defence of Democracy in Central Asia