Analytical Group of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy in Central Asia
Georgia does not share borders with the countries of the post-Soviet Central Asia (PSCA). Nevertheless, it is precisely through Georgian territory that the Middle Corridor passes, linking the region with Europe while bypassing Russia.
Objectively, this position as a gateway to Europe for the PSCA countries and Azerbaijan constitutes Georgia’s most significant geopolitical and geo-economic asset. Therefore, regardless of internal political divisions or differing foreign policy approaches, any government in Georgia that is even minimally sovereign and nationally oriented will have a strong interest in advancing the Middle Corridor project.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that not every government ruling in the name of Georgia—even one invoking the defense of national interests—will necessarily be sovereign or nationally oriented. Georgia remains under pressure from its northern neighbor, Russia, whose political establishment widely embraces ideas of restoring the so-called “historical Russia” (whether in the form of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union) and denying genuine geopolitical independence to post-Soviet states.
Moreover, in the historical struggle either to preserve or to dismantle empire, Georgia has often played a leading role, contributing at different times to both outcomes. It is within this broader context that the geopolitical ambiguity characterizing its present position becomes more understandable.
Georgia’s Struggle for Independence: Advances and Setbacks
Alongside the three Baltic republics, Georgia stood at the forefront of the struggle by former Soviet republics to achieve state independence. Notably, the violent suppression of demonstrations in Tbilisi by Soviet troops on April 8–9, 1989, preceded by nearly two years the assault on the Lithuanian television tower on January 12–13, 1991.
However, the response to the independence movements in Georgia and the Baltic states differed significantly, both in Moscow and in the West. Western countries began recognizing the independence of the Baltic states as early as February 1991 (for example, Iceland), with the process accelerating after the failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada, the United States). On September 6, even the USSR itself formally recognized their independence. Moscow’s approach to developments in Georgia, however, was fundamentally different.
The Georgian people voted for independence in a referendum on March 31, 1991; the Georgian parliament declared independence on April 9, 1991; and on May 26, 1991, a committed pro-independence leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was elected president. In response, Moscow and pro-Russian actors pursued a dual strategy: on the one hand, they played the separatism card in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; on the other, they sought to discredit Gamsakhurdia as a radical nationalist.
In late 1991, criminal networks linked to Moscow, with informational support from it, organized the armed overthrow of Gamsakhurdia, who had resisted keeping Georgia within Russia’s sphere of influence. A similar scenario unfolded several months later in Tajikistan, where Russia supported the overthrow of a national-democratic government in Dushanbe—an event that led to a bloody civil war. Just as Emomali Rahmon, a Soviet-era official, came to power in Tajikistan with Moscow’s backing, so too in Georgia, in March 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze—a former Soviet foreign minister and Politburo member—returned to power with Russian support.
Under Shevardnadze, Georgia followed not the path of the Baltic states, which decisively broke their political dependence on Russia, but that of many post-Soviet republics that joined the Commonwealth of Independent States. Georgia formally joined the CIS on October 8, 1993, despite the fact that Russia had effectively seized South Ossetia and Abkhazia through military means. Over the following decade, Georgia under Shevardnadze evolved into a highly corrupt and dysfunctional state, ultimately triggering a new national-democratic revolution in 2003—the Rose Revolution—led by Mikheil Saakashvili.
Saakashvili launched a series of reforms, the most important of which included:
- a radical overhaul of state institutions, in some cases involving the dismissal of entire structures (as with the police), downsizing, recruitment of new personnel, retraining of existing staff, and the introduction of new operational standards alongside sharply increased salaries;
- economic liberalization, including tax reductions and simplification, deregulation, improved conditions for starting and running businesses, privatization of state enterprises, and attraction of foreign investment;
- the creation of a service-oriented state, with a comprehensive reform of public services, the introduction of modern administrative systems, and the establishment of Public Service Halls, where citizens could quickly complete registration and notarial procedures.
The key outcome of these reforms was the transformation of Georgia from a corrupt and ineffective post-Soviet state into a relatively efficient, compact, and modern one. While bribery had been widespread across nearly all sectors in the early 2000s, within a few years it became rare. Georgia rose in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index from 133rd place in 2004 to 51st in 2012. Between 2003 and 2013, the economy grew by approximately 70%, while per capita income roughly tripled. State revenues increased significantly due to improved tax collection and a reduction in the shadow economy. Street crime and the influence of organized crime also declined, supported by strict legislation targeting criminal networks.
Unsurprisingly, Mikheil Saakashvili—like Zviad Gamsakhurdia before him—became an adversary of Moscow, where power by that time had come to be firmly dominated by former KGB officials led by Vladimir Putin. As before, this culminated in war, this time in South Ossetia in 2008. Following the conflict, Russia openly challenged Georgia’s territorial integrity and officially recognized the “independence” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Unlike the earlier episode, however, Russia failed to overthrow the government in Tbilisi by force, as Western countries mobilized in its support.
In 2012, however, Saakashvili lost elections to the Georgian Dream party led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who maintained close ties to Russia. This marked the beginning of a new phase in Georgia’s post-Soviet history, which continues to the present day.
The Georgian Dream government did not dismantle all the achievements of Saakashvili’s reforms, nor did it return the country to its previous condition. Formally, it even continued the course toward European integration, resulting in Georgia being granted EU candidate status in 2023.
At the same time, however, longer-term trends began to emerge, shaped by two key factors:
- an effort to normalize relations with Russia, in contrast to the confrontational approach associated with Saakashvili;
- the concentration of power in the hands of a new oligarchic elite, above all Bidzina Ivanishvili, who has effectively exercised influence over the state beyond formal institutions.
These developments have led to:
- a deterioration of relations with the EU and the effective stagnation of Georgia’s integration process;
- the adoption of restrictive legislation targeting NGOs linked to the EU and the United States;
- a sharp deterioration in relations with Ukraine due to the government’s refusal to join sanctions against Russia;
- growing and not unfounded accusations that the Georgian authorities are pursuing a pro-Russian policy.
At the same time, under Georgian Dream, projects associated with the Middle Corridor—intended to connect the PSCA region with Europe via Azerbaijan and Georgia while bypassing Russia—have continued to develop. These include:
- modernization of the Georgian section of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway;
- upgrading of railway infrastructure between Tbilisi and the Black Sea coast;
- expansion of the East–West highway from the Azerbaijani border through Tbilisi to Black Sea ports and the Turkish border;
- development of the Anaklia deep-sea port, as well as modernization of the ports of Poti and Batumi.
However, the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026 have been marked by developments that threaten Georgia’s role as a gateway to Europe for Central Asia and Azerbaijan.
Georgia at a Geopolitical Crossroads
In December 2025, the movement of cargo through the “Red Bridge” border crossing from Azerbaijan into Georgia was effectively paralyzed by the actions of Georgian border guards and regulatory authorities. Long traffic jams formed, and carriers reported that perishable goods were spoiling while waiting in queues.
It is important to note that these actions by the Georgian authorities were not triggered by any steps taken by Azerbaijan against Georgia. Rather, they appear to have been a reaction to the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. For three post-Soviet decades, Armenia had effectively functioned as a logistical dead end for Azerbaijan. As a result, Georgia served as the only viable route for exporting Azerbaijani goods—and goods transiting through Azerbaijan—to the EU and Turkey, allowing it to benefit economically from transit flows.
However, the opening of trade routes between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Armenian territory, and especially the prospective launch of the Zangezur Corridor (TRIPP), could potentially reduce Georgia’s transit revenues and weaken its strategic position.
The visit of Ilham Aliyev to Tbilisi in April 2026, and his talks with Bidzina Ivanishvili, were intended to ease these tensions and address concerns within the Georgian leadership regarding Azerbaijan’s rapprochement with Armenia. At present, these efforts appear to have been at least partially successful, and Aliyev’s assurances that Georgia would remain a strategic economic partner for Azerbaijan were clearly not accidental.
Nevertheless, the precedent of temporarily restricting transit through Georgian territory—not only for Azerbaijan but effectively for the entire PSCA region—highlights risks that go beyond simple transit competition. These risks are rooted in the broader geopolitical vulnerability of contemporary Georgia.
Despite the current Georgian government’s declared commitment to a multi-vector foreign policy—aimed at maintaining independence from both Russia and the West—this is a difficult strategy to sustain for a country of Georgia’s size, particularly when around 20 percent of its territory remains under Russian military occupation. This challenge is further compounded by the deterioration of relations with Europe and growing confrontation with pro-European opposition forces within the country, both of which risk increasing the government’s dependence on openly pro-Russian actors whose geopolitical objectives differ from those of Georgian Dream.
As in Armenia, where revanchist anti-Azerbaijani and anti-Turkish forces closely linked to the church are firmly oriented toward Moscow, pro-Russian actors in Georgia operate under the banner of ultranationalism. This ideology combines anti-Western, anti-Turkish, anti-Azerbaijani, and broadly anti-Islamic narratives, often framed in terms of Orthodox identity.
Such groups—including the Alt-Info network, the party “Conservatives for Georgia,” as well as figures like Levan Vasadze and their supporters—seek to undermine Georgia’s cooperation both with the EU (through anti-Western rhetoric) and with Azerbaijan and Turkey (through anti-Islamic narratives).
Formally, Georgian Dream does not endorse these positions, particularly the overt hostility toward Islam, Muslims, Turks, and Azerbaijanis promoted by ultranationalist actors. However, within the realities of a semi-authoritarian system shaped by Ivanishvili, such groups—unlike the pro-Western opposition—do not face systematic pressure from the authorities. It is therefore unlikely that they could operate so freely without at least tacit approval.
For this reason, observers increasingly point to the existence of an informal arrangement between Georgian Dream and ultranationalist actors: the authorities allow them to operate, while these groups in turn direct their hostility not at the government but at its opponents and at various minority groups, including Muslims.
At the same time, this dynamic effectively places the Georgian authorities in an informal alignment not only with domestic extremist forces but also with actors who openly advocate closer ties with Russia and seek to reorient Georgia away from alternative geopolitical centers. As a result, there is a growing risk that, in the event of further political polarization, the ruling authorities could become increasingly dependent on ultranationalist forces and influenced by their agenda.
In such a scenario, Georgia could shift from being a gateway to Europe for Central Asia and Azerbaijan into a logistical dead end—either as a result of the policies of a more radicalized government (as illustrated by the temporary blocking of transit from Azerbaijan in late 2025–early 2026), or due to internal instability that could render Georgian transit routes unreliable or insecure.
Georgia’s Prospects for Central Asia and Azerbaijan
In light of the above, contemporary Georgia can be seen as a country at a geopolitical crossroads, a situation that places at risk the implementation of the Middle Corridor project intended to connect the PSCA region with Europe. The domestic and foreign policy of Georgian Dream—characterized by balancing between competing geopolitical centers while consolidating authoritarian tendencies at home—has a limited time horizon and will, sooner or later, require a clear strategic choice:
- either in favor of deeper cooperation with Europe and Turkey, alongside the development of relations with Azerbaijan and Central Asia;
- or toward becoming a de facto vassal of Russia, potentially extending to accession to the so-called Union State.
The PSCA countries, in the context of their broader emancipation from Russian imperial influence and revanchism, are undoubtedly interested in Georgia pursuing the former path. The absorption or destabilization of Georgia by Russia could only be partially offset by integrating Armenia into the Middle Corridor—provided that Armenia succeeds in establishing stable partnerships with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
While the Zangezur Corridor could link Azerbaijan with Turkey via Armenian territory, Armenia’s lack of direct access to the sea would still necessitate additional financial and logistical efforts to deliver goods to Turkey’s Black Sea coast without relying on Georgian routes. Moreover, if Russia were to absorb Georgia, Armenia—already under significant pressure from Moscow—could find itself in an even more vulnerable position.
For this reason, the geopolitical emancipation of Central Asian states and Azerbaijan from Russia critically depends on Georgia’s authorities—whether current or future—returning to a consistent strategic course and abandoning accommodation with forces that effectively act as a fifth column for Moscow within the country.
In this context, it is worth noting that while Armenia under Nikol Pashinyan represents an example of positive transformation for the PSCA countries, the policies pursued by the current authorities in Georgia—as well as in Kyrgyzstan—illustrate the risks of backsliding from a constructive development trajectory toward uncertainty and the potential reassertion of control by an imperial center.
