Author: Maksim Baidak
Vice President, Foundation for the Defense of Democracy in Central Asia
Vilnius, 19 November 2025
Formula 5+3+
Central Asia and the Caucasus represent two geographically, economically, historically, and culturally interconnected regions with a combined population of over 100 million people, a total GDP of approximately USD 633 billion, and located in the central part of Eurasia.
Geographically, Central Asia and the Caucasus border such centers of power and development as East Asia, Asia Minor, the Near East, South Asia (through Afghanistan), and Eastern Europe.
The political foundations of the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus today consist primarily of five states of the first region (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) and three of the second (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia), which creates the 5+3 formula.
At the same time, geographically, historically, and ethnically, Afghanistan is to some extent also part of Central Asia, as it is inhabited, among others, by representatives of its peoples (alongside Pashtuns, who serve as a bridge to South Asia). At present, it is undergoing a process of political transformation, after the completion of which it could also join the regional cooperation of Central Asian countries.
In addition, historically and ethnically, the Russian region of Bashkortostan is likewise part of Central Asia; in the event of a transformation of the geopolitical architecture, it could also become a full-fledged part of the region, while directly bordering Tatarstan as the core of Idel-Ural.
The same applies to the Caucasus. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia border in the north not an abstract Russia—historically formed in the region of Eastern Europe—but its Caucasian republics and peoples, which, under a changed geopolitical architecture, may return to the common Caucasian home.
As in the case of Central Asia, the political Caucasus may be expanded toward the Near East, given that millions of Azerbaijanis live in northern Iran.
Nevertheless, in analyzing the current potential of the two interconnected regions, one should proceed from the 5+3 formula.
Options related to changing this formula by increasing the number of countries belonging to these regions will be considered in the second analytical block.
Two Regions and One Macro-Region
Central Asia and the Caucasus are divided by the Caspian Sea, but despite this, they are bound together by common roots. With the exception of Tajikistan, all Central Asian countries are Turkic-speaking (which is why this region was once called Turkestan), just as Azerbaijan and part of the peoples of the North Caucasus (Kumyks, Nogais, Karachays and Balkars).
At the same time, the non-Turkic peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia are closely connected with the Turkic ones, and in many cases we are speaking of genetically and culturally related peoples who speak different languages (in some cases bi- or multilingual), which creates a unique unity and, at the same time, diversity of this macro-region.
Thus, in fact, it is precisely the Caspian Sea that constitutes the main divider of this otherwise unified macro-region, which must be taken into account when analyzing the prospects and obstacles to its integration.
At the level of concrete realities, Central Asia and the Caucasus can be, and are already to some extent being, integrated primarily in the fields of energy, transit, and infrastructure.
Cooperation of the Central Asian and Caucasus Countries in the Sphere of Energy
The Caspian Sea is the main divider of Central Asia and the Caucasus, but at the same time it is the geographical obstacle the overcoming of which becomes the basis of cooperation among the countries, including in the sphere of energy. Therefore, the principal interaction of the countries of the two interlinked regions in this area takes place within the framework of the Caspian Energy Corridor project, namely:
• the export of Kazakhstani and Turkmen oil and gas through Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Black Sea and further to Europe;
• the routes of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor (TANAP–TAP) gas pipeline;
• work on the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project (Turkmenistan → Azerbaijan → Turkey → Europe), which is in fact blocked by Russia and Iran.
The pipelines of the Southern Gas Corridor were put into operation in 2006 for the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), with expansion of commercial flows through TANAP in 2018–2019 and supplies to Italy through TAP in 2020.
As a result, Central Asian gas from Azerbaijan already reaches Southern Europe through TANAP/TAP, and in 2022 a contract was signed to double imports by 2027 to approximately 20 bcm/year. Capacity expansion of SCP/TANAP/TAP is being developed for this purpose.
The situation is more complicated with “swaps” (exchanges) of Turkmen gas among Turkmenistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan. At its peak, their turnover reached about 1.5–2 bcm/year; however, due to disagreements, in January 2024 they effectively stopped. In 2025 Turkmenistan and Turkey agreed on gas supplies for Turkey’s needs via Iran of up to approximately 2 bcm/year.
The oil pipelines operate for exports to Europe both of Azerbaijani oil and for the transit of Kazakhstani oil by ferries across the Caspian along the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) corridor.
Until recently, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium functioned mainly through shipments from Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk (CPC). However, after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and due to sanctions, Kazakhstan began increasing the pumping of oil through Azerbaijan via BTC. In addition, work has begun on developing an export route via Georgia’s Supsa, used for exports to Europe through the Western Route Export Pipeline.
Today, export volumes amount to: via BTC – on average about 1.4 million tons/year (with plans to increase to 1.7 million tons/year), via Supsa – around 150 thousand tons/year.
Growth Potential and Obstacles to its Realization
Overall, the potential of the regions/macro-region in the field of oil and gas export/transit is significantly higher than its current indicators.
Thus, analysts point to a possible figure of 5–7 million tons/year of oil exports through BTC compared to the current maximum of 1.7 million tons/year, and an increase of 10 bcm/year of gas exports through SCP/TANAP/TAP by 2027.
The realization of the potential of the regions/macro-region in this sphere is hindered mainly by the following factors:
– the opposition of Russia and Iran to the construction of underwater pipelines along the seabed of the Caspian Sea in the sectors they consider their own (the northern one belonging to Russia, the southern one to Iran), relying on the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (2018);
– the relatively weak capacities of ports/fleet on the Caspian, the logistics of tanker/ferry lines, as well as the vulnerability of alternative routes to potential strikes by “unknown” competitor drones;
– the still weak interest on the part of the EU in investing in project development, both due to objective geopolitical risks and internal environmental regulation.
It should be noted that these factors are largely universal in restraining the overall potential of economic cooperation and development of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Therefore, below they will be considered in a broader context.
In addition, in the energy sphere there exists a project for the generation and export of Central Asian–Caucasus “green” electric power to Europe, specifically:
• wind energy of Kazakhstan;
• hydropower of Kyrgyzstan (and partly Uzbekistan);
• hydro- and renewable energy sources (RES) of Georgia;
• with further connection of the planned offshore RES in the Caspian.
The project has the potential to generate and supply about 6–10 GW/year, but is currently constrained by discussions of investment, legal, political, managerial, and technical issues.
Cooperation of the Central Asian and Caucasus Countries in the Sphere of Transport and Logistics
The problem of transport connectivity of Central Asia and the Caucasus has two dimensions: local (regional, interregional) and global (continental).
The trilateral transport projects of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey (that is, at the junction of the Caucasus and Asia Minor), such as the modernization of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, have a predominantly local character, although they may also be integrated into the interregional and continental transport chains of the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The same can be said about bilateral interstate projects in the development of such ports as Alat or Aktau. At the same time, it is noteworthy that, in addition to cooperation in this sphere between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, which are directly linked across the Caspian, active cooperation is also taking place today between Kazakhstan and Georgia, which do not share a common border or maritime zone. For instance, Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan’s KTZ Express) owns a terminal in the port of Poti and is considering participation in the expansion of the port of Batumi, as well as investing in Georgian railway logistics in order to accelerate the transit of its cargoes.
However, the project that may become truly global or at least continental for the entire macro-region of Central Asia and Kazakhstan is the Eurasian Middle (Trans-Caspian) Corridor, an alternative to the Russian Northern Corridor.
Before Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, 90% of China–Europe transit relied on the Northern Corridor via the route China → Kazakhstan/Mongolia → Russia → Belarus → EU (Poland/Baltic States).
In the new geopolitical and security configuration that emerged after Russia’s open aggression against Ukraine and the Kremlin’s shift toward confrontation with the EU, the issue of the need for a logistics alternative not tied to Russia has become acute.
Such an alternative may be the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route or the Middle Corridor, operating along the route: China → Kazakhstan → Caspian Sea → Azerbaijan → Georgia → Turkey/Black Sea → Europe.
The main “nodes” of the Middle Corridor are:
Railway nodes:
• China: Xi’an, Alashankou, Khorgos
• Kazakhstan: Dostyk, Altynkol, Astana, Aktau, Kuryk
• Azerbaijan: Alat, Ganja
• Georgia: Akhalkalaki, Tbilisi
• Turkey: Kars, Ankara, Istanbul
• European:
1. Istanbul → Sofia → Belgrade → Budapest → Vienna → Western Europe;
2. Georgia → Black Sea (Poti/Batumi) → Romania (Port of Constanța) → Hungary → Slovakia → Austria → Germany.
Maritime nodes:
• Caspian: Aktau, Kuryk ↔ Alat
• Black Sea: Poti, Batumi ↔ Constanța/Burgas/Varna.
The ports of Kazakhstan (Aktau, Kuryk) already possess a throughput potential of 24 million tons, which is used only minimally (in 2022 – 4.7 million tons). The same applies to the port of Baku, which has a throughput potential of 15 million tons/year, but in 2024 was utilized at roughly half (7.6 million tons).
Overall, the successful implementation of the Middle Corridor project requires multiple-fold increases in investment, as well as institutional and political integration of its main beneficiaries – the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. And this places on the agenda the issue of the geopolitical framework of their cooperation.
The Political Dimension of the 5 + 3 Format
In addition to the deeply rooted historical factors, the five Central Asian and three Caucasian post-Soviet states today are situated in a similar geopolitical position, determined by:
• the aspiration to preserve the independence gained from Moscow and not to allow it to restore the Russian empire in any form in the post-Soviet space, which implies the necessity of countering Russia-centric projects and initiatives in all spheres and creating alternatives to them with the participation of both regional and extra-regional balancing actors;
• an interest in cooperation with China, but without total dependence on it, rather in the format of mutually beneficial and mutually dependent cooperation that does not allow Beijing to use it as leverage over the 5 + 3 countries;
• an interest in cooperation with the EU as the main beneficiary of a potential reorientation of energy supplies to Europe, as well as of transport links between Europe and China and other countries of Southeast and South Asia bypassing Russia;
• an interest in cooperation with Turkey as a potential geopolitical alternative to Russia in Central Eurasia, especially for the Turkic-speaking countries;
• an interest in the participation of the United States and the United Kingdom in these projects, as countries seeking to create energy and logistical alternatives to Russian energy supplies and routes and capable of providing substantial support to this end.
It is worth noting that recently the 5 + 3 countries have been advancing in these directions, which is reflected in:
• summits of the leaders of the Central Asian states and the agreements reached at them;
• the development of cooperation within the Organization of Turkic States;
• joint summits with EU or US leaders;
• bilateral meetings and cooperation, including along the Baku–Astana axis.
Separately, it is important to note the progress in the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia with the assistance of Turkey and the United States together with the United Kingdom, which in principle makes it possible to speak of a 5 + 3 format rather than 5 + 2.
Until recently, Armenia was in fact a logistical dead end of the Caucasus, blocking transport communication across its territory between Turkey and Azerbaijan with the Central Asian countries. The abandonment of territorial claims, the signing of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the launch of the Zangezur Corridor (in any format and under any name) between Nakhchivan and mainland Azerbaijan will in effect reintegrate Armenia into the macro-region and may transform it from its remote periphery into one of its logistical centers.
Prospects of 5+3+
The bloodiest war in Europe since 1945, unleashed by Russia, and its unwillingness to end it on the one hand, and the reaction to this war by the surrounding world on the other, including the 5+3 countries that have chosen a course of strategic distancing from Russia, may lead to the most radical changes in the geopolitical configuration of Central Eurasia.
Just as many empires that unleashed large wars were unable to survive them, it cannot be excluded that the current agonizing form of the Russian Empire may also cease to exist as a result of this war and its consequences.
The 5+3 countries, unlike Russia, do not advance territorial claims against anyone and respect internationally recognized borders. They have no territorial claims against Russia (while from Russia such claims toward them are voiced regularly), and they will clearly recognize its internationally recognized borders as long as they are recognized by the entire international community.
At the same time, the 5+3 countries, especially those bordering Russia, such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, must take into account the possibility of its future disintegration and the emergence of territories and political entities adjacent to them that are no longer controlled by Russian authority and that may subsequently be recognized by the international community as independent states.
For these three border countries, and for all the 5+3 states, such a development carries both potential risks and the potential for positive changes. The risks of this scenario are not the subject of the present analysis; however, the emergence of new states representing peoples historically related to the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus has direct relevance to the topic of their development potential.
Below, the consequences for the 5+3 countries of hypothetical geopolitical changes will be considered in two regions: in the north of Central Asia — in the Southern Urals and the adjacent Volga region, and also in the northern Caucasus.
The Southern Urals and the Volga Region
In the event of disintegration processes in Russia, two of its current republics bordering Central Asia and each other — Bashkortostan and Tatarstan — may also become independent.
Bashkortostan is the largest republic of Russia in terms of territory and population, with a developed industry and a rich natural-resource base. Its territory covers approximately 143,600 km², and its population is about 4.0 million people. In addition to picturesque mountain-forest landscapes of an “Alpine” type in the south, and the rivers Agidel, Kama, and Volga, it possesses enterprises of oil-refining and chemical industries, mechanical engineering, the agro-industrial sector, and thermal power plants.
The Bashkirs are close relatives of the Kazakhs, who in turn inhabited together with them a significant part of the current Orenburg Region, and continue to reside in it. Bashkortostan is separated from Kazakhstan by the so-called Kuvandyk Corridor — approximately 400 kilometers of territory deliberately cut off from it by Stalin and incorporated into the Orenburg Region, historically formed on the lands of Bashkirs and Kazakhs.
For the representatives of Bashkir and Tatar national circles, it is obvious that ensuring unhindered communication between Bashkortostan and Tatarstan with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries is for these two republics a question of survival and development in the event that they become independent states. In turn, this issue may be resolved not necessarily through changing the territorial belonging of these approximately 400 kilometers (for example, through territorial exchange), but also, as an option, according to the scenario of the Zangezur Corridor.
In this case, direct access to the Central Asian countries will also be obtained by the most economically developed republic of Russia — Tatarstan. This predominantly Turkic republic has a territory of about 68,000 km², a population of about 3.9 million people, and possesses its own water and land resources, a developed oil, chemical, aviation and mechanical engineering industry, an IT park, an agro-industrial complex, and much more.
Tatarstan is the informal leader of other Volga republics such as Chuvashia, Mari El, Komi, which are connected by economic, historical, ethnic, and cultural ties.
In the event of the effective joining of Bashkortostan to Central Asia and through it the establishment of direct links with the Volga republics, the region may significantly strengthen its economic-development potential:
• the Kuvandyk Corridor may become the northern branch of the Middle Corridor;
• the integration of the economic-industrial complexes of the countries will enhance the energy-resource base, industrial potential, and mobility of valuable specialists within the region;
• greater stability of demand for logistical and energy projects (pipelines, railways, ports on the Caspian) will emerge;
• products of Bashkortostan and the Volga republics will gain access to the ports of the Caspian, and the products of Central Asian states — to transport routes already located in Eastern Europe.
Strategically, such a scenario will allow:
• strengthening and developing the Middle/Caspian Corridor, the energy and industrial chains connecting Central Asia – the Caucasus – the Volga region – the EU, and the resilience of Eurasian logistics due to a new northern foundation;
• creating a new large market and a “rear base” for the 5+3 countries;
• stimulating investment throughout the entire region.
Northern Caucasus (Potentially – the Eastern Black Sea Region)
In the context of prospects for attaining independence, the regions of today’s Russian North Caucasus may be classified into three categories:
• with the highest chances of independence – Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan;
• with medium chances of independence – other (non-Russian) republics of the North Caucasus;
• with the lowest chances of independence – territories with the status of krais and oblasts, which are usually regarded as “Russian,” but have their own ethno-regional identities.
Regions of the North Caucasus with the Highest Chances of Independence
Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan may be attributed to the regions of the North Caucasus with the highest chances of independence, because:
• Russians constitute in them an overwhelming minority of the population (1.2%, 0.7%, and 3.3% respectively);
• they possess an external border (Chechnya and Ingushetia with Georgia, Dagestan with Georgia and Azerbaijan);
• after the collapse of the USSR, Chechnya turned into a state independent of Russia, managed to defend this status in the first Russo-Chechen war (1994–1996), and even having lost it as a result of the second Russo-Chechen war, remains within Russia in an entirely special position, under which it is governed by the clan of Ramzan Kadyrov, who builds his relations with Moscow in his own way.
The accession even of these three North Caucasus republics to the club of Central Asian and Caucasian states 5+3 (that is, its transformation into 5+6) would further strengthen this macro-region. In economic terms, these three states are primarily interesting due to their transit geography:
• Dagestan – through additional ports on the Caspian and simultaneously by pushing Russia out of the central Caspian to the north;
• Chechnya – as a corridor to Georgia (via Argun–Itum-Kale → Shatili; or via the Georgian Military Highway in coordination with Ingushetia);
• Ingushetia – as a transit link Chechnya ↔ North Ossetia ↔ Georgia.
Thanks to this, these countries could become part of the Middle (Trans-Caspian) Corridor, and the 5+6 club could expand it to:
Central Asia → Caspian → Dagestan (port) → Chechnya/Ingushetia (overland segment) → Georgia → Turkey/Black Sea → Europe.
Dagestan occupies a special position among them, which on the one hand offers serious opportunities, and on the other requires the initial creation of a format that would remove possible contradictions within the 5+6 club.
Dagestani ports in Makhachkala and Kaspiysk currently operate to receive cargo from Aktau, Kuryk, Turkmenbashi, Baku and transit it further through Russia, which in this format makes them strategically dangerous for the 5+3 countries.
On the other hand, transforming Dagestan into an independent state would make its ports more attractive as a way to bypass Russia; however, it would automatically risk turning them into competitors to the Azerbaijani ports, which are already performing this function on the western Caspian coast today.
This consideration applies in general to all three of these new potentially independent Caucasus states, because:
• Dagestan duplicates the port function of Baku/Alat on the Caspian;
• Chechnya–Ingushetia duplicate Azerbaijan’s land “bridge” to Turkey;
• the logic of the Middle Corridor is such that whoever controls the nodes collects the tariffs and political weight; today this is done by Azerbaijan, and therefore, if one acts within a narrowly national logic, these three states will turn into its competitors and it will not be interested in their emergence.
A mutually beneficial solution to this problem may be a regional–interstate format instead of a narrowly national one. That is, Azerbaijan and Dagestan must first of all agree on the creation of an Eastern Caspian logistics alliance, within which the following would be ensured:
• a single operator for different ports;
• a unified system of standards, tariffs, and cargo insurance;
• ferry and container service schedules;
• distribution of functions, for example, on the principle:
– Alat (Baku) – containers + high-margin cargoes;
– Makhachkala (Dagestan) – bulk cargoes, agricultural flows, petrochemicals;
– Chechnya – transshipment hubs + services + equipment repair + industrial parks;
– Ingushetia – logistics warehouses + customs brokerage; and so on.
Regions of the North Caucasus with Medium Chances of Independence
The remaining republics of the North Caucasus (above all Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia) can be considered its regions with medium chances of independence because of:
• the significant number of Russians in their population; or
• territorial contradictions with neighbors;
• deeper ties with Russia.
On the basis of these factors, it makes sense for the 5+3 countries to plan the inclusion of these potential states into their framework at a second stage, after the 5+3+3 (5+6) format has been mastered.
Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia are not transit nodes, but they possess what the other Caucasus states do not have in such volume: resort and tourist resources, mountaineering infrastructure, and recreational territories. Therefore, their integration into the 5+6+ format will not require the creation of a supranational logistics alliance intended to eliminate competition for transit, as in the case of 5+3+3 – it will be sufficient simply to integrate them into the service-oriented and high-yield contour of the Middle Corridor.
This can be achieved through the creation of:
• a land-based tourist branch to the north from the transit routes of the Middle Corridor;
• (intensification of) direct air tourist routes from the 5+3+ countries;
• in the longer term – the establishment of a “Caucasus Tourist Ring,” within which the routes and infrastructure of the national resorts of the Caucasus countries are integrated.
Separately, it is worth noting the agrarian potential of these republics in the sphere of:
• mountain animal husbandry;
• cheese-making traditions;
• mineral waters;
• environmentally friendly farm products,
which may be in demand for export to the countries of the Middle East.
Regions of the North Caucasus with the Lowest Chances of Independence
Krasnodar Krai, Stavropol Krai, and Rostov Oblast may be perceived as the regions of the North Caucasus with the lowest chances of independence, because at present the overwhelming majority of their population is considered—and considers itself—to be Russian and connected to Russia.
Moreover, the hypothetical inclusion of Krasnodar Krai, with its ports, into the 5+3+ club would automatically create competition for the Georgian ports, which today are used in the eastern Black Sea region to bypass Russia. Therefore, even theoretically, the admission of these regional states into the 5+3 club would require structuring relations between Krasnodar Krai (Kuban) and Georgia according to the model of the above-mentioned relations between Dagestan and Azerbaijan.
At the same time, despite all the difficulties of hypothetically integrating these regions into the 5+3+ format, it should be taken into account that:
• otherwise, if they remain Russia’s outpost in the Caucasus, it will overhang from this “balcony” over the new states and pose a threat to them;
• historically, these regions are home to a population that is not typically Russian, which has its own ethno-cultural characteristics and has more than once demonstrated an inclination toward sovereignty: the Kuban Cossacks in Krasnodar Krai, the Don Cossacks in Rostov Oblast;
• Ukraine may become a guarantor of their independence, interested in their detachment from Russia and in their integration into non-Russian projects in the future, as they are ethnically and historically linked to Ukraine, although at present they are used as a staging ground for the war against it.
Thus, in the long-term perspective, after mastering the 5+3+3+ format, the Caucasian and Central Asian states—through interaction with Ukraine—could in one form or another incorporate into their projects the potential states of the Don and Kuban Cossacks, which possess significant potential in the fields of logistics, tourism, industry, and agriculture.
Central Asia and the Caucasus: Global Prospects and Challenges
As follows from the above analysis, in the changing geopolitical environment, global prospects are opening up before Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Already in the foreseeable future, within the existing 5+3 format, they may become the principal transit—and thus geo-economic—alternative to Russia in Central Eurasia. And in the future, under the 5+3+ expansion scenarios discussed above, through cooperation with Ukraine (and in the future, Belarus) as Russia’s main competitor in Eastern Europe, they may effectively replace Russia as the core (the heartland) of Central Eurasia.
Nevertheless, the current condition of the 5+3 countries is still far from such an ambitious development. Moreover, it harbors serious threats not only to the potential of their development, but also to their independence, because:
• in Tajikistan an absolutely corrupt, backward regime is in power—one that possesses no strategic thinking whatsoever;
• Kyrgyzstan is vulnerable to internal political destabilizations, which have occurred repeatedly;
• Kazakhstan is in Russia’s crosshairs and is vulnerable to potential hybrid actions by Moscow, including in the north, where a significant Russian-speaking population resides;
• Uzbekistan is suspended between modernization and the preservation of dictatorship, which may result in upheavals in the future;
• the regime in Turkmenistan represents a Central Asian version of the DPRK, which deprives this country of the potential for full participation in global and regional development;
• one-fifth of Georgia’s territory is occupied by Russia, while the rest of the country is highly polarized and stands at a crossroads regarding its developmental model;
• the government of Nikol Pashinyan in Armenia, pursuing a policy of distancing from Russia and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, is increasingly vulnerable to hybrid attacks from Russia;
• Azerbaijan in 2025 has turned into a strategic adversary of Russia in the region, with all the resulting risks.
Thus, practically all the 5+3 countries exist in a state of unstable equilibrium. The strategic choice of the macro-region is also clear:
• either to increase their independence from Russia and their geopolitical weight and to become its counterbalance in Central Eurasia;
• or to return to the state of its periphery, of satellites, up to being incorporated into a new Union State.
In this context, the geopolitical prospects of the 5+3 countries directly depend on the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war, because Russia’s victory in this war would open the way for it to restore dominance across the entire post-Soviet (and not only) space, whereas its defeat in this war would open before Central Asia and the Caucasus the prospects outlined above.
At the same time, the realization of these prospects will require from the Central Asian and Caucasus countries a fundamental modernization—above all, of their political elites and political thinking. Regimes focused on retaining absolute power over their peoples at any cost, and uninterested in anything beyond this horizon, cannot be serious geopolitical actors.
At the same time, any national opposition to such dysfunctional regimes must proceed from the fact that none of the Central Asian or Caucasus countries alone can move to another geopolitical league. Just as Europe leapt forward with the ideology of the European Union, or as the Caucasus’ leaders at the moment of the USSR’s collapse proposed the project of a Common Caucasian House (which Moscow prevented from being realized), so today the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus need a paradigm of Central-Eurasianism: the consolidation of Central Asia and the Caucasus through cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus in countering the imperial ambitions of the Kremlin.
Such a paradigm requires the most intensive cooperation among the countries of the macro-region, both among themselves and with external allies and partners interested in its implementation, such as Turkey, the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and others.
