expanded text of the report by Maksim Baidak, Vice President
The Foundation for Defence of Democracy in Central Asia (FDDCA)
during the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference 2025, in Warsaw, 6–17 October 2025
Ladies and gentlemen,
My report will be devoted to the current state of democracy in the post-Soviet Central Asian states and to the dynamics of democratic, or rather, as will be seen from the content of the report, anti-democratic processes within them.
In order not to be unfounded, I will rely on concrete indicators of leading international analytical structures that assess democratic processes according to specific criteria, and that regularly index them for all countries of the world. The assessments are based on a combination of factors, including electoral procedures, civil pluralism, freedom of the media, academic freedoms, the functioning of executive bodies, the development of national political culture and civic engagement, the socio-economic rights of citizens, and other indicators.
However, it is possible to preface their enumeration immediately with a sorrowful conclusion, which will be substantiated in the course of my report. Our organization, the Foundation for Defence of Democracy in Central Asia, notes two tendencies in the functioning of democratic institutions in the region: deterioration in some cases and stagnation in others. Accordingly, in general one may speak of an overall paradigm of continuing de-democratization in post-Soviet Central Asia.
General assessment of the situation
According to democratic criteria, the post-Soviet Central Asian states (Post-Soviet Central Asia, PSCA) may be divided into three main categories. As a basis for assessment, we take the indexing system of Freedom House, which publishes annual reports on the state of democracy in different states of the world, as well as other analogous structures such as the Economist Intelligence Unit and Reporters Without Borders.
The lowest index category among PSCA countries is occupied by Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, the highest — by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the intermediate category — by Uzbekistan.
The lowest category of democratic indicators among PSCA states
Speaking of the lowest category, the situation is worst in Turkmenistan, where everything is consistently very bad with democracy. At the same time, in recent years the situation in Tajikistan is also steadily deteriorating and is moving in the direction of the Turkmen one.
Turkmenistan
To understand the state of democracy, or more precisely, its complete absence in post-Soviet Turkmenistan, it is sufficient to know that according to the Freedom House index, it is worse there than in North Korea.
Thus, according to the aggregate criteria, Turkmenistan is given one point less than the DPRK: 2/100 for the former and 3/100 for the latter. This difference is explained by the fact that although citizens have no political rights in either the first or the second case — which is indexed by a score of 0/40 for both — in terms of civil liberties the DPRK is assessed as 3/60, whereas Turkmenistan only as 2/60.
Turkmenistan occupies the last place in the post-Soviet Central Asian region and the 161st position in a rating of 167 states. Here the democracy index has not changed for a quarter of a century and remains at the extremely low level of 1.66 points out of ten. For comparison, in the benchmark democracy, Norway, the index amounts to 9.81 points. In terms of press freedom, Turkmenistan has an index of 22.01 points out of one hundred. This places Turkmenistan at the 175th place in the global ranking.
Based on this, the Freedom House assessment of Turkmenistan appears maximally concise and unambiguous:
“Turkmenistan is a repressive authoritarian state where political rights and civil liberties are in practice almost entirely absent. Elections are under strict control, ensuring virtually unanimous victories for the president and his supporters. The economy is dominated by the state, corruption is systemic, religious groups are persecuted, and political dissent is not tolerated.”
Tajikistan
The aggregate Freedom House indicators for Tajikistan today look as follows:
5/100
Political rights: 0/40 (as in Turkmenistan and the DPRK)
Civil liberties: 5/60
Tajikistan has a unique political history among the PSCA states, fundamentally different from that of Turkmenistan. If in Turkmenistan the full extent of power since 1991 was initially concentrated in the hands of the totalitarian dictator Saparmurat Niyazov, who in 2007 was simply replaced by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow — without any change in the nature of the established regime in the country — then post-Soviet Tajikistan by that time had passed through three major phases of its history.
The first phase: the Civil War of 1992–1997, which followed almost immediately after the attainment of independence, during which the democratic and nationally-oriented forces of the country opposed the nomenklatura-criminal revanche of the former communist establishment and the criminal groups associated with it. The latter were supported by mercenaries, military instructors, and special services of Russia and Karimov’s Uzbekistan.
The second phase: the National Dialogue regime established in 1997. In order to end the devastating and blood-draining armed confrontation in the country, the democratic and civic forces of Tajikistan, through the mediation of Russia, agreed to lay down arms in exchange for amnesty, integration into the emerging pluralistic sociopolitical system of the country, and the creation of a government of national unity.
Naturally, as in the case of the Budapest Memorandum, Russia also did not fulfil here its — albeit in this case rather moral — obligations as a guarantor toward the side that had placed trust in it, namely the civic-democratic forces of Tajikistan. Accordingly, after a short-lived second phase of the political history of post-Soviet Tajikistan, the next one followed.
The third phase: approximately since 2003, Emomali Rahmon, representing post-communist criminal circles and having consolidated his power with the support of the regimes of Russia and Uzbekistan, having achieved the cessation of armed resistance by the civic-democratic forces, effectively cast aside the framework of the National Dialogue and began the destruction of the opposition, dissent, and civil liberties, as well as the establishment of a regime of personal dictatorship and terror.
A full enumeration of the numerous facts illustrating the establishment in Tajikistan of a regime not even of an authoritarian, but of a totalitarian nature, deserves a separate report — and not just one. There is already a considerable number of materials on this topic on the website of our Foundation, and we will continue systematizing and publishing them further. Therefore, one may state the main point — from a certain moment, namely after the establishment of a stable dictatorship of Emomali Rahmon, Tajikistan began a rapid movement into the category in which Turkmenistan already is. And this is despite the fact that relatively recently the country still had real — albeit forced for the regime — multiparty politics, political opposition, independent media, civic organizations, etc.
At the same time, the situation is continuously worsening. By 2025, the democracy index in Tajikistan had fallen to 1.83 points on the ten-point scale used by the Economist Intelligence Unit. For comparison, in 2023 this indicator amounted to 1.94 points out of ten. According to the hundred-point press-freedom assessment system used by Reporters Without Borders, Tajikistan is ranked 155th in the world with a score of 33.31 points.
Freedom House in its reports notes 2016 as a kind of turning point, when amendments to the constitution were adopted in Tajikistan allowing dictator Rahmon to remain in power indefinitely. Based on the totality of indicators, the regime established in Tajikistan is characterized as follows:
“Political life in Tajikistan is almost entirely controlled by Emomali Rahmon and his extended family, leaving citizens with extremely little opportunity to participate in the political process. Relatives of Rahmon hold numerous government posts and control key sectors of the private economy. In practice, no group among the population enjoys full political rights and electoral opportunities. President Rahmon, who is not freely elected, and his closest circle face virtually no resistance in defining and implementing policies and only strengthen their power. The parliament, controlled by the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT), does not function as an effective check on the vast constitutional powers of the executive branch. Representatives from Rahmon’s native Kulyab region dominate in the governing bodies.
The country’s foreign and domestic policies are constrained by the government’s dependence on Russia and China in matters of external security, by economic dependence on Russia due to labor migration, and by high levels of indebtedness to China.
…The government controls almost all mass media and broadcasting resources. The state forces out independent publications and encourages self-censorship. Civil defamation suits are used to paralyze media outlets critical of the authorities. In 2021 the authorities required bloggers to register with tax authorities — a requirement that, according to experts, strangled the last independent voices. Authorities regularly block critical websites, news portals and social networks, and also resort to periodic complete internet and messenger shutdowns to suppress criticism.”
Uzbekistan: the intermediate category of democratic indicators among PSCA states
The aggregate Freedom House indicators for Uzbekistan today look as follows:
12/100
Political rights: 2/40
Civil liberties: 10/60
As can be seen, this is significantly higher than that of the PSCA states of the lowest category, but as will become clear further, it is significantly lower than that of the PSCA states of the highest category, which allows us to assess Uzbekistan as a PSCA country of the intermediate category according to the criteria of democratic processes.
Comparing the trajectory of the sociopolitical development of post-Soviet Uzbekistan with the trajectory of political development of post-Soviet Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, one can observe both similarities and differences.
The regime established by Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan in 1991 differed little from the regime established at the same time in Turkmenistan. The method of political succession was similar — through the death of an absolute dictator. However, the specificity of Uzbekistan lies in the fact that, unlike Turkmenistan, the new head of state — Shavkat Mirziyoyev, having concentrated power in his hands, carried out a certain, albeit very limited, liberalization of the country. This distinguishes its developmental trajectory both from Turkmenistan and Tajikistan: unlike the former, in Uzbekistan one can speak of a small dynamic of development, and unlike the latter, this dynamic was in a positive rather than a negative direction, i.e., toward expanding democratic opportunities rather than constricting them.
Under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, something resembling a civil society and its institutions emerged in the country. Against the background of serious deterioration in other states, Uzbekistan managed to rise in the global ranking to 146th place. In the World Press Freedom Index, Uzbekistan occupies 148th place with an indicator of 37.27 points out of one hundred.
Nevertheless, over the past year, Uzbekistan’s indicators also declined to 2.10 points out of ten. After movement toward democratization in the initial period of President Mirziyoyev’s informal reforms, Freedom House notes a series of deteriorations and an associated rollback toward de-democratization in recent years.
Thus, in 2023, constitutional amendments were adopted, the voting for which, according to the OSCE, “was accompanied by serious violations” during voting and vote counting, and media coverage of the campaign was neither impartial nor balanced. As a result, they “increased the presidential term from five to seven years and effectively ‘reset’ the existing two-term limit, allowing the incumbent President Mirziyoyev to bypass this restriction — similar to how Karimov had previously done.”
Attempts by the Uzbek authorities to significantly reduce the autonomous republican status of Karakalpakstan, which they began to undertake already in 2022, and which caused mass protests there, are also regarded by observers as a manifestation of de-democratization. This, in turn, led to repressions against several Karakalpak activists.
On the basis of all the above, modern Uzbekistan is also given an unfavorable characterization:
“Although the reforms carried out after President Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016 led to certain improvements in some areas, Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian state with almost no signs of democratization. No opposition party operates legally. The legislative and judicial branches in practice serve as instruments of the executive branch, which conducts reforms by decree. The mass media remain under strict state control. Reports of torture and other forms of ill-treatment continue, although the most high-profile cases led to dismissals and criminal cases against some officials, and petty corruption has been noticeably reduced.”
The highest category of democratic indicators among PSCA states
In the states of the highest category of democratic indicators among the PSCA — Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan — the indices are higher than in Uzbekistan, not to mention Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, in parameters such as the ability to create various political parties or other competing associations of one’s choice, freedom of political preferences of citizens from forces external to the political sphere, and political rights and electoral opportunities of minority population groups.
If in PSCA states of the lowest category a solid zero stands for all these parameters, then in the states of the highest category this indicator amounts to approximately 1 out of 4. This does not make them either free or relatively free countries, but it makes them more free than their aforementioned neighbors.
Kazakhstan
The aggregate Freedom House indicators for Kazakhstan today look as follows:
23/100
Political rights: 5/40
Civil liberties: 18/60
The country has a relatively mild authoritarian regime with a democracy index of 3.08 points, corresponding to the 118th position in the global ranking. Press freedom here is measured at 41.11 points out of one hundred, which places Kazakhstan at the 142nd place in the world ranking.
Unlike Tajikistan, where Emomali Rahmon has continuously ruled for three decades (with a caveat regarding the forced limitation of his power during the period of civil war and the period of overcoming its consequences), and unlike Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan where power changed as a result of the death of a dictator, in Kazakhstan in 2019 a peaceful transfer of power took place from the architect of its post-Soviet statehood and its irreplaceable leader Nursultan Nazarbayev to his chosen successor Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
However, peaceful this transit turned out to be only at the moment of its execution. A few years later, in 2022, it resulted in mass protests spilling into armed confrontation, which a number of observers linked to the ambiguity of the outcomes of this transfer and the contradictions persisting within the Kazakhstani establishment. As a consequence, President Tokayev was forced to turn to Putin’s Russia for assistance in militarily suppressing the uprising, which led not only to casualties at that moment, but also to the strengthening of repressions subsequently.
In Kazakhstan, as in a state of the highest category of democratic indicators among PSCA countries, there are more opportunities than in states of other categories in the sphere of media, academic freedoms, the creation of NGOs, and other aspects not directly related to the formation of power in the country. Nevertheless, the general characterization of the country by Freedom House does not allow it to be considered either free or partially free:
“Parliamentary and presidential elections are neither free nor fair, and the authorities systematically sideline or imprison genuine opposition figures. Major media outlets are either in the hands of the state or belong to businessmen loyal to the government. Freedoms of speech and assembly remain restricted and punishable, and corruption is widespread.”
Kyrgyzstan
The aggregate Freedom House indicators for Kyrgyzstan today look as follows:
26/100
Political rights: 4/40
Civil liberties: 22/60
As can be seen, Kyrgyzstan’s indicators for political rights and civil liberties are the highest among PSCA states. During its post-Soviet history, the country has had six presidents, three of whom were replaced as a result of mass protests, and another one prematurely. This sharply distinguishes it from other PSCA states and places it on a par with such countries as Ukraine and other emerging democracies.
It is not surprising that Kyrgyzstan is the only PSCA state that for a long time was included in the category of relatively free countries. However, after the events of 2020, it, too, moved into the category of non-free states, albeit with higher indicators of political rights and civil liberties than its neighbors.
Kyrgyzstan did not succeed in institutionalizing its relative advantages compared with its neighbors. The parliamentary system established as a result of the mass protests of 2002 and 2010 proved fragile and was swept away in 2020 by violent uprisings, which led not only to a change of power, but to the establishment of a regime of political terror. Observers note that Sadyr Japarov, who seized power with the help of violent groups, continued after taking office as president to use their resources to pressure political opponents and expand his influence over the life of the country.
As a result, at present Kyrgyzstan has fallen to 3.52 points out of one hundred, compared even with 2022, when it had an index of 3.89 points. Today Kyrgyzstan occupies the 120th position in the world press-freedom ranking.
De-democratization and prospects for democratization of PSCA states
Thus, the situation with democracy in the PSCA countries is bad — either stably very bad, as in Turkmenistan; or stably becoming worse, as in Tajikistan; or after short-term improvements it begins to deteriorate, as in Uzbekistan; or as in Kazakhstan, where it is one of stable stagnation; or as in Kyrgyzstan, where for a long time it was relatively good, but now is also becoming bad.
One may say that this is a regional trend. In the view of many observing the region from the outside, Central Asia — in particular the post-Soviet part — is perceived as a space of unalterable dictatorships, where democracy simply has nowhere to come from. The tendencies and assessments listed in this report would seem only to confirm that. However, even from what has been listed above it should be obvious — they are not without alternatives.
Thus, in Tajikistan the spontaneous forces of civil society for five years openly opposed the regime supported by neighboring dictatorships, and then, after the establishment of the illusion of a national dialogue, continued to defend their rights politically, creating parties, media, civic and human-rights organizations, etc. It took the Rahmon regime many years to cleanse the public-political space of Tajikistan, but even today thousands of Tajiks continue to oppose it from prisons, from external and internal exile.
Kyrgyzstan, as noted, is also a country in which a strong demand for democracy has manifested itself, and which until recently Western observers characterized as relatively free. One may also speak of democratic potential in Kazakhstan, where numerous political, civic, and human-rights projects and media outlets also emerged, and where civil society is developing in its own way — to the extent possible under an autocratic regime. This potential also exists in Uzbekistan — otherwise its new leader would not have embarked upon democratization after the transfer of power, evidently sensing a social demand for it. Moreover, one cannot fail to note the high potential of the Karakalpak part of Uzbek society, manifested in protests against attempts to devalue its autonomy. As for Turkmenistan, the situation there must now already be considered in the same context as the prospects for transformation of the DPRK — after decades of the harshest suppression of any free thought, such a transformation would clearly require the broadest international support.
But why, instead of realizing this existing potential for democratization in Central Asian societies, is the opposite happening? Not the least reason for this is the now global trend of democratic recession, about which many observers speak. It is not only China and Russia, which support autocratic regimes in the region’s countries, that are uninterested in democratization of the PSCA. Unfortunately, within the West as well — which for many decades was perceived as the flagship of global democracy — in many countries politicians are coming to power who either question it, or declare that the West should not support the aspiration toward democracy in other parts of the world.
All this creates an extremely unfavorable background for the democratization of PSCA states. And nevertheless, it is necessary to understand that global and regional trends have a habit of changing. At the same time, there is a demand for democratization in PSCA countries, and the transformation of most of them in the future is inevitable, since the regimes established in them clearly have an unstable and historically transitional character. It is precisely for this reason that the Foundation for Defence of Democracy in Central Asia will continue its activities to support civil societies and the aspiration toward democratization in the countries of the region.